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Security aspects of energy
Dimensions of energy security
Summary
Energy security is more than sustainability, competitiveness and secure supply. It is
a multidimensional concept, including external as well as internal action. Economic,
political and security measures have to be applied in combination to generate the
essential synergies. Thus only an integrated approach, that combines all the different
aspects of energy security, can be successful. The EU still suffers a strategic deficit
and tries to adjust single setscrews, whilst a wholesale energy security strategy is
imperative.
1. The concept of energy security
Energy security usually is defined as “[r]eliable supplies at [a] reasonable price”.1
Nevertheless, if one takes a closer look at what secure supply constitutes, the com-
plexity of this task becomes obvious. Thus the often-cited triangle – supply security,
sustainability and competitiveness – marks the relation between the three main
aspects of energy policy, but it is insufficient as a framework for energy security. And
moreover, a solely economic understanding of securing the energy supply by means
of trade and business is not enough. Growing dependence on foreign supply – as
most European countries experience it today – results in uncertainty, if not insecu-
rity. Before political answers can be given to the growing threat of energy insecurity,
the concept has to be clarified.
To put it simply, energy security – or in other words stability – is all about security.
Any longer interruption of a steady and plenty flow of energy would massively harm
a nation’s economic output, political stability and the personal wellbeing of its citi-
zens. Our societies are entirely addicted to energy services, such as gas stations or
electricity. Not only private households, but also the business sector and even public
authorities and governmental agencies are in the dire need of energy to function
properly. Hence a satisfactory supply with energy is a precondition for economic
growth and also for the legitimacy within a political entity. But who is in charge of
securing our energy demand and why can it be designated as a security issue? While
today security has a broader and deeper meaning as it was understood before the
end of the Cold War, it is still the primary task of each state or sometimes that of state
collectivities (combining national and international security). In an international
context “security is about the ability of states and societies to maintain their inde-
pendent identity and their functional integrity.”2 Already in 1952 Arnold Wolfers
defined (objective) security quite universal as the “absence of threats to acquired
values”.3 Thus in accordance to Wolfers’ definition, security is more than just defen-
se policy and physical survival; it also implies “a substantial range of concerns about
the conditions of existence.”4 Economic welfare and individual safety and the stabi-
lity of a political system can be seen as core values of every society, thus energy
insecurity comprises a major threat – or better risk5 – to those values. The riots
during the major blackout 1977 in New York City, cutting off millions of people from
electricity for 15 hours, are an example what even a short energy interruption could
provoke. So this article will concentrate on the security aspects of energy security in
different policy areas.
Defining energy security not from the normative end – sufficient and affordable sup-
ply – but from the input side where private or political actors can add to a higher
level of safety, four different but at the same time overlapping dimensions can be
identified: 
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1. Internal policy dimension
2. Economic dimension
3. Geopolitical dimension
4. Security policy dimension
On a superordinated level these dimensions all together have to do with security as
energy security already was designated as a prerequisite for economic processes as
well as political stability and legitimacy. Although energy affects almost every aspect
of our lives, the above listed are the key dimensions for stabilizing and safeguarding
the supply of energy. Even though this paper separates them for the analysis in rea-
lity they are interdependent. For example: Functioning international energy markets
and domestic supply chains are vital prerequisites for energy security, but without
stability and security in the producing countries they become useless.
The following pages will sketch out who might fulfill these tasks and by what means
a higher level of energy security could be reached. One should keep in mind that
absolute security is never within reach, but if the right policies are enacted a priori,
the looming impacts of an energy crisis could be attenuated. One thing that can al-
ready be said at this point is that due to increasing independencies, no nation-state
alone will be autonomous enough to fulfill these duties alone. Thus a precondition
for energy security is global or at least regional cooperation. From a European per-
spective the European Union (EU) might be the most promising actor if Brussels acts
in a subsidiary symbiosis with its member states.
1.1. The internal policy dimension
The 2005 World Energy Outlook estimated a cumulative global infrastructure invest-
ment of $17 trillion until 2030, whereof the OECD-countries will have to contribute
about 40%.6 The total amount of predicted investments even rose in the subsequent
report.7 So the internal dimension first of all calls for extensive financial acquisitions
for maintenance and extension of energy networks. Especially the growing demand
of electricity requires massive investment in new grids and power plants. Some major
blackouts resulting from technical failure or accident – as the one in November 2006
that stretched almost completely over Europe – can be taken for instance that parts of
our infrastructure are subject to failure. Furthermore, investment in short time spare
capacities for oil production to even out sudden interruptions – e.g. in case of region-
al conflicts – and demand fluctuation is urgently needed. As will be shown in chapter
4, the security of transnational energy networks also asks for joint action, but prima-
rily each state has to assure ample domestic capacities in production, storage and
reserves. Building terminals and storage facilities for liquefied natural gas (LNG) as
well as investment in modernizing mature plants and grids could be a first move on
that direction. In addition to domestic infrastructure policy, the EU can support its
member states in form of general directives or best-practice guidelines and by solida-
rity action – e.g. access to strategic reserves – in case of national shortfalls.
Besides investment and maintenance of infrastructure, emergency reaction should
not be forgotten. Every supply interruption challenges the service providers as well as
local and national authorities. The existing strategic oil reserves – which are obligato-
ry in every OECD member state – can stand-in some time. But neither natural gas nor
electricity is or respectively can be storied in big quantities or over long periods of
time. Thus every intrusion of supply, whether by accident or due to fuel shortage,
would affect industrial production, public services and all the other societal activities.
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The above mentioned events in New York or the breakdown of oil production in the
Mexican Gulf after Katrina are just two of many examples of our dependency on 
stable energy services. Thus civilian emergency planning to guarantee essentials servi-
ces – such as health care, legal order or nutrition – in case of a crisis is urgently need-
ed. Preparedness is thus a major task in dealing with the energy topic. Even though
this lies within the core domain of each nation state, regional or international collabo-
ration could lead to synergies. The EU’s claim for energy solidarity or the cooperation-
mechanism of the International Energy Agency have to be further evolved and streng-
thened to deal with the growing risks of failure or attacks on infrastructures.
Another area for improving internal energy security lies in increasing energy efficien-
cy or productivity. Efficiency for end-users is to be understood as same outcome with
a lower input of energy, which means saving energy and lowering costs.8 In the indus-
trial sector, rising efficiency stands for the lesser use of energy per unit produced and
thus decoupling energy-input and economic growth. At the spring summit of
European heads of government 2007 the EU agreed on the common goal to increase
energy efficiency to reduce energy-usage at 20% until 2020.9 And the U.S. Department
of Energy Strategic Plan states: “By reducing the energy intensity of America’s econo-
my, energy efficiency advances provide one of the best means for reducing the Nation’s
dependence on foreign fuel supplies and improving the quality of the environment,
both in the near and long term.”10 To do so, the EU’s plan “Towards a European
Strategic Energy Technology”, focusing on efficiency, diversification, decarbonisation
and trans-European interconnection, sketches out possible progress to a safer energy
future.11 Also, joint US-EU research programs on energy technology – for e.g. more
efficient engines, industrial machinery, power generation and power-saving end-user
products – are quite promising in order to reach those ambitious goals.
Apart from needs for infrastructure, consuming states also ought to rethink their
specific fuel mixes. Again electricity is the key factor at this point. Alternative sour-
ces of energy – such as renewables and nuclear – can decrease import dependence
and contribute to supply security as long as they are based on indigenous resources.
In particular wind energy and photovoltaics can be at least used for complementary
electricity production.12 Hitherto the use of ‘green’energy for heating and cooling or
in transportation is still underdeveloped. In the US 96% of the energy used for heat-
ing comes from conventional sources, such as natural gas, electricity and distillated
oil.13 And within the EU renewables only account for less than 10% in heating and
cooling private households.14 Geothermal or solar energy respectively could increase
the level of autonomy and save fossil fuels for e.g. building strategic national reser-
ves. While the composition of specific fuel mixes will remain a national domain, the
European Commission could recommend margins for diversification and provide
information about each member state’s fuel usage to gain transparency and eventu-
ally a more coherent energy policy.
1.2. Economic dimension
Firstly, the quality of (national) energy policy could be evaluated in terms of meeting
domestic demand. As mentioned in the beginning, a sufficient and affordable sup-
ply is the main precondition for energy security. This means state – or supranational
– actors have to set the rules for functioning markets, thus end- and industrial-users
can acquire the amount of energy they request at prices that are reasonable. Energy,
namely in form of electrical power, is not only a vital economic input-factor but also
dominates our ever-day life. One only has to think about how one’s daily schedule
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would be affected in case of an energy shortage. Distributed production – regional or
even local – eliminates transport risks that correlate with distance, puts pressure on
energy prices and adds to security by broadening output facilities. So lawmakers
have to create a framework for multiple providers of energy services. A negative
example in this case is Germany, where only four major companies dominate the
electricity market. Liberalized markets with a variety of competitors may also bene-
fit from innovations in efficiency and the use of alternative fuels. The EU’s ambitions
to liberalize the markets for electricity and natural gas have already succeeded in this
and should now be expanded to the Union’s neighborhood. Thus, transparency and
stability could be exported to the near abroad and could lead to an energy security
repercussion in the EU.
In addition to the scarcity of fossil fuels, their global distribution especially in the so-
called strategic ellipse is a major factor of insecurity. While crude oil is preponder-
antly transported over see lanes, most of the natural gas is pipeline-bound. Thus an
ambivalent interdependence evolves that binds consumers and producers together
on a long-term base. The effects are durable relations between exporters and impor-
ters but on the other hand a high addiction to one geographical source of supply. So
energy-related business should be based on a double strategy: long-term contracts
and diversification. Contracts are the legal foundation of uninterrupted supply, while
diversification opens new transit-routes and origins of resources. Accordingly, not
only accidental shortages but also the impact of intended disruptions could be mit-
igated. The main contribution of business to security and diversity is to be seen in
upstream- and transport-investment in producing countries. Net-importers can
improve their situation substantially if national companies are involved in resource
exploration and extraction abroad. States could stimulate such foreign investment by
granting security loans or other incentives for fully integrated corporations. Working
together, the EU, its member states and other major actors should promote the glob-
al implementation of the rule of law in energy related trade, potentially under the
umbrella of the World Trade Organization.
Another field for economic action – if required with state support – can be identified
in the struggle for technological leadership. Groundbreaking inventions in fuel effi-
ciency, the use of alternative sources of energy or related technologies directly add to
energy security by reducing costs – which brings forth money for new investment
and private spending –, the possibility of fuel diversification and by lowering con-
sumption. Next to these effects, technological leadership generates jobs, stimulates
economic growth and thus legitimizes existing political systems and furthermore
reduces environmental degradation. The European Commission therefore calls upon
the EU member states for joint engagement: “The energy technology innovation pro-
cess demonstrates structural weaknesses that can only be overcome by concerted
action, simultaneously on many different fronts … Working together will benefit all,
exploiting the federating role that the European Union can play in the field of ener-
gy.”15 Whilst the European states on their own are to weak – or in the terms of an
economy of scale: to small – to compete on a global level, the Union as a whole has
a fair chance to gain leadership in energy technologies.
1.3. Geopolitical dimension
As energy resources usually are transported over long distances crossing various
national territories, concerted action is the only way to secure worldwide trade in
energy goods. But as long as global energy services are not included into the umbrella
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of the World Trade Organization, alternative forms to formulate common rules have
to be elaborated. On a regional base, the EU-initiatives on single markets for elec-
tricity and natural gas are an outstanding example. In contradiction to the common
market regulations there are still some national obstacles that obstruct intra-
European energy trade.16 Anyhow, the free flow of energy resources and services is
an adequate means to avoid short-term supply interruptions and to encourage qua-
lity of services as well as technological innovations within the EU. Again the EU is to
small and holds not enough domestic resources to be a sufficient energy market on
its own. Thus liberalization of those markets should be promoted on a larger scale
and have to be codified under the formal rules of international law.
On a wider geographical scope as the EU internal market, the 1994 Energy Charta
Treaty (ECT)17 and its follow-up agreements tried to enact a global legal framework
for transnational energy services. The ECT includes:
– most-favored treatment for foreign investments,
– non-discriminatory trade in materials, products and equipment,
– regulations for dispute settlement, and
– the promotion of energy efficiency.
From a European perspective the main shortcoming of the ECT lies in the puny par-
ticipation: The Russian Federation signed the treaty, but never ratified it. The USA,
Saudi Arabia, Iran and other states like Algeria are only observers and do not aim at
full membership. Enlarging the ECT-regime geographically and a functional en-
hancement would contribute to energy security, particularly in form of transparency
and liability by enhancing the scale of this institutionalized energy market order.
Recently a trend towards re-nationalization of resource deposits, infrastructures and
energy corporations can be observed. One of his first actions as the newly elected
Bolivian president, Evo Morales, was to place the energy sector under state control,
not long after the battle between Yukos and the Kremlin took place in Russia.18 The
nationalization of the energy business hinders the workings of economic rules and
enables that political motives become predominant, which causes at least one nega-
tive effect: state-owned companies do not always respect market rules and may
instead be involved in domestic or even international politics. Using resources as
political leverage is nothing new. As early as 1957 Abdullah Tariki – then head of
Saudi Arabia’s Directorate of Oil and Mining Affairs – stated that oil was „the stron-
gest of weapons that the Arabs wield.“19 Today growing import addiction, a rising
number of net-consuming states and the inevitable depletion of fossil fuels in the
years to come are framing a new great game of Realpolitik.
Not only the possibility to use oil and gas as a political “trump card”20 but the very
fact that private consumers – or to state it more clearly private companies – have to
deal with e.g. National Oil Companies (NOCs), unveils an asymmetric relation.
While in economics normally cash-flow and supply-demand equilibriums are the
key determinants, NOCs and other state-owned companies sometimes are part of
the toolbox in international power politics. In combination with what Thomas
Friedman called “The First Law of Petropolitics”21 conflicts between “petrolist states”
and consuming states may increase. With new players on the playing field Western
democracies will have to balance between supply security and their efforts on the
promotion of democracy. One can take the Chinese role in the Nigerian oil business
and Beijing’s reluctance to accept a UN resolution against the regime in Khartoum
as an example for the future of international energy politics.22 Close cooperation 
Soft Power
Energy Infrastructure Security
Baumann · Energy Security as multidimensional concept
C·A·P Policy Analysis · 1 · 2008 Page 9
between business actors, national governments and EU representatives could main-
tain the equilibrium between nationalized upstream and private downstream.
Especially the relations to resource-rich and aggressive states like e.g. Iran include
an economic security dimension and cannot be handled without support from
governmental institutions. And even single-handed action of European states will
not be successful without backing from Brussels. Due to the threatening addiction of
e.g. the Baltic EU-member states or Poland on Russian oil and natural gas supply23
a coherent approach of the Union towards Moscow is urgently needed.
When reviewing older publications on energy politics24 first of all the growing import
dependency is mentioned, and later on shortages due to the scarcity of fossil fuels is
an important topic. Only recently have new threats been recognized more prominent-
ly, while the older ones still prevail. International or transnational terrorism, piracy and
political instability are among the main considerations related to energy security
nowadays. So the geopolitical dimension of energy security requires strategic concepts
and holistic means, especially in dealing with fragile states. The various initiatives of
the OECD and NATO and above all the EU’s European Neighborhood Policy (ENP)
already take great efforts to stabilize pivot states in their geographical periphery.
Democratization and development policy can, by empowering state authorities,
encourage good governance and thus strengthen energy security. On a larger scale,
Javier Solana calls for a coherent, strategic and interest-based “external relations poli-
cy on energy … fully recognising the geo-political dimensions of energy-related secu-
rity issues”.25 Therefore, the EU should develop an integrated foreign energy policy
concept, through cross-pillarization of its external instruments such as ENP, CFSP
(Common Foreign and Security Policy) and the Commission’s external relations.
1.4. Security policy dimension
The dominant threats, mentioned in the chapter above, cannot be tackled by soft
power alone. Terrorist attacks on infrastructures or piracy whereof both are not exe-
cuted by state actors, need to be addressed with conventional security policy. Last
year terrorists launched 331 attacks on utilities, such as oil refineries, tankers or elec-
trical transformers.26 And piracy is not any longer uncommon in some waters at the
African east coast, next to the Indian subcontinent or Southeast Asia.27 As Europe –
and the USA as well – depend on the continuous flow of oil and gas to fuel their eco-
nomies for transportation and everyday-life, they cannot ignore the rising imminent
threats on their supply. One possible asset in this context is the close cooperation
with vulnerable states, including information sharing, training and debates on best
practices. The paradox contained by that situation is the some of the most threate-
ned states posses the lowest capacities according to risk assessment, crisis reaction
and well-trained military or police forces. For the good of their own energy security
as well as to support those states, the industrialized consuming nations should
expand their engagement within that field. Besides giving technical and operational
assistance to the regions in danger, NATO, the EU and other security regimes should
think about they themselves will have to react in case of an emergency.
Lately Energy Infrastructure Dimension (EIS) was introduced as a fixed term to the
debate.28 Although some might instantly think of resource wars, classical security
policy and even military capabilities can play an important role in safeguarding ener-
gy supplies. As a follow-up effect of the growing import addiction more energy
resources have to be transported over even longer distances, which make a supply
security strategy indispensable. Although the EU does mention the use of CFSP/ESDP
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(European Security and Defense Policy)-instruments, Brussels does not clarify how
those might be used.29 On the other hand, NATO  already has found niches, where
it can contribute to energy security: “We support a coordinated, international effort
to assess risks to energy infrastructures and to promote energy infrastructure securi-
ty.”30 Thus EIS refers to threat analysis and immediate action in case of an emergen-
cy.“Securing pipelines and chokepoints will require augmented monitoring as well
as the development of multilateral rapid-response capabilities.”31
Without calling it EIS directly, Javier Solana lately introduced a quite similar appro-
ach: “In the area of crisis response … we should do more to get shared assessments
of the risks and vulnerabilities we have. Related to this is the question of physical
protection – refineries, terminals, pipelines etc. This is an obvious concern to all –
because of terrorism, spill-over of regional conflicts etc. The private sector clearly has
a role to play. But I believe this is an area where we should do more together in the
European Union and with third countries.”32 Assessing risks include regional con-
sultations, military analyses and intelligence reports but when a crisis occurs armed
forces may be essential for physical protection of infrastructure, to settle conflicts and
to secure transit routes. Armed conflicts or even wars about the access to resources
are not that unrealistic.33 Again, with tighter markets and rising demand the availa-
bility of sufficient resources – and especially energy – is a vital interest of every state,
and will foster tensions between the “haves” and the “have-nots”. Another intere-
sting question is how to deal with resource deposits in fragile states, when sover-
eignty is not longer existent? At which point of state failure are stabilizing efforts or
even a military intervention legitimate? The use of force as suggested here does not
contain the illegal annexation of foreign resource deposits, as Henry Kissinger
recommended in his “strangulation”-speech.34 Rather the 1987/1988 operation
“Earnest Will”carried out to shield Kuwaiti oil tankers during the Iran-Iraq war could
be an example.35 Hard power should not be understood as the only means of enfor-
cing energy security, on the contrary, it must be seen as a strictly complementary
asset. NATO already is involved in maritime security with its naval patrols, e.g. under
the “Active Endeavour”– mission in the Mediterranean Sea.36 The European Union
due to its commitment to the Petersberg tasks – the full spectrum of crisis manage-
ment – should engage more within this last dimension of energy security.37
2. Energy Policy for Europe
Due to the magnitude of the problem and the above-mentioned shortcomings of the
nation state when on its own, at least some involvement of the institutions in
Brussels is a precondition for an effective approach. The EU is the world largest
importer of oil and natural gas and therefore must have a special interest in energy
security. Hence last year the Council of the European Union launched the “Energy
Policy for Europe”-initiative38 and anounced an “effective Community policy,
coherence between Member States and consistency between actions in different
policy areas.”39 On supply security, the Council identified three main challenges:
– A common external policy approach,
– diversification of fuel origin, transit routes and resources, and
– common crisis management, based on solidarity and subsidiarity.
But while during the German EU-presidency plenty of means against global clima-
te change were initiated, the external dimension of energy security still does not go
beyond the instrument of various dialogues. Climate change and energy efficiency
are vital but not sufficient elements of an integrated energy policy. The EU did right
C·A·P Policy Analysis · 1 · 2008 Page 11
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to name sustainability, competitiveness and security of supply as key elements of the
Energy Policy for Europe.40 But concentrating on ecology and technology alone will
not be enough to secure the Union’s future energy demand. Whilst the single mar-
kets for electricity and natural gas in combination with the new efforts on reducing
carbon dioxin, promoting energy efficiency and alternative sources of energy are
serious first steps, the external dimension – especially its hard power component –
is still underdeveloped. In their joint proposal the High Representative Javier Solana
together with the European Commission name “… [e]nhancing physical … security
as well as the energy infrastructure safety”among the guiding principles of the exter-
nal security of energy supplies.41
To progress this component, especially in the field of energy security the EU has to
formulate a stringent strategy, showing ways and aims of its external energy policy.
In its 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) the EU mentions,“Energy dependence
… [as] a special concern for Europe” but does not develop any further congruent
approach on that topic.42 Instead of all the Green Papers and action plans the EU
needs a single document, a stringent framework for the EU’s future energy policy
including the external dimension, in particular all aspects of security. As the global
competition for resources – and especially energy resources – evolves into the realm
of geopolitics, the European strategic deficit results in intolerable vulnerability. A clo-
ser cooperation between EU and NATO together with a realistic and interest orien-
ted revival of the transatlantic partnership can help the Europeans to overcome this
strategic deficit.
3. Guidelines for the EU
In a nutshell, energy security cannot be reduced to economic means, and security in
this field of action does not stand for crude militarization. While the United States
and others accepted this complexity for quite some time, Europe still lacks that kind
of strategic thinking and appeal to the force of markets and energy dialogues.
Tightened competition for energy, the growing instability in some of the producing
countries and thus a new power game requires a political adjustment. As the latest
Venusberg report states: “Europeans must, therefore, balance their rightly value-
based approach to international relations with hard political realism if they are to
compete effectively.”43 For that reason the EU has to locate the main risks to
European energy supplies, formulate its political and security interests and subsume
them into a pragmatic strategic concept.
Since none of the above-mentioned dimensions alone will be sufficient to provide
energy security, each of them has to be incorporated in a comprehensive political
agenda. Certainly, while economic, technological and political means are to be pre-
ferred, military and civil-military crisis management form a vital cornerstone of a
full-fledged energy policy. The keyword at this point should be complementarity. It is
not “either or”, rather the challenge is to use the right instrument at the right time.
The economic as well as the internal dimensions are somewhat predominant, while
the importance of political aspects – complementary to the renaissance of NOCs –
will grow. But security and military means in terms of monitoring, risk assessment
and training of local forces should be considered on a permanent basis, whereas
military intervention in form of peace enforcement and post-crisis management are
more ultima ratio than everyday business.
Next to the multidimensionality of means, energy security asks for a multilateral
approach.44 Therefore, institutions like the International Energy Forum or the
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International Energy Agency can provide a basic common understanding, while
other organizations or regimes such as the NATO or the ECT have to take care of
supplementary aspects. As there is no global framework to deal with all aspects of
energy security, a variety of regional, bi- and multilateral organizations should en-
gage in providing supply security. From a European perspective the EU should be a
dominant actor in this field, as it is the only organization that covers – at least theo-
retically – all aspects of the introduced concept. To do so, the Union has to overcome
its strategic deficit and clarify what role it wants to play. Anyway, multilateral coop-
eration at least between Europe, the OPEC-States, Russia, the USA and the develo-
ping giants China and India is essential to tackle the problems of energy security in
an adequate way.
4. Conclusion
Obviously there is more than one path to energy security, however, unilateralism and
reductionism will not be successful. Already proposed technical and economic efforts
in the field of energy policy are important first steps, nevertheless a more holistic
approach is needed. Especially internationally coordinated, multilateral security
measures have to be further elaborated. The basic security aspects of energy securi-
ty are still somewhat unattended, particularly in public opinion. However, a sustain-
able concept of energy security must bring together all above-mentioned dimen-
sions, ranging from mere economic and political facets to the full spectrum of soft as
well as hard security. Tightening energy markets and increasing threats to energy
infrastructure ask for a new thinking of how to safeguard energy supplies. The use of
security instruments should not be seen as an ultima ratio option in form of a militari-
zation of energy policies, rather it should be seen as a complementary answer to sup-
ply risks that cannot be addressed by other means alone.
Thus states should begin to understand the complexity of energy security and
respect energy as a vital interest. Instead of dealing with it in either economic, poli-
tical or security means they should see security as an umbrella of energy policy. To
protect our acquired values – as cited in the introduction – economic development,
individual safety and political stability a stable and sufficient supply of energy is
needed and therefore a precondition for security. Without energy or secondary ener-
gy services our lives would be different and not for the better. So energy policy
should be securitized45 and thus has to be handled as a security matter: “The days of
easy energy are over…“46.
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